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The subject of the subject has left us, of late, in something of a muddle. Post- 
modernism has taken the post-enlightenment subject for a standing joke. The "thinking 
subject," the subject that begins in the mind's consciousness of its own motions and becomes 
the locus of all cognitive action and the measure of all truth, the subject launched by 
Cartesian philosophy and reified by Romanticism, this universal and universalizing subject 
now strikes us as provincial and platitudinous, if too coercive in its workings to be quaint. 
We have come to regard the "historical subject" as a concept of superior political and 
explanatory power, and we argue about essence and constructedness, and we try in the midst 
of our arguments to leave a space for agency, which is to say for narrative--for affect and 
effect, for memory and change. 
In the midst of capitalism's late decline and ironic "triumph," in the midst of theoreti- 
cal and political developments that sharply dispute the supposed autonomy and coherence of 
the bourgeois subject, that subject exhibits remarkable durability as a default cognitive and 
political device. Stories organized and authorized by individual experience (biographical, 
psychodynamic, parabolic or exemplary) still seem to us (late capitalism's uneasy survivors) 
to possess uniquely satisfying explanatory capacities. The individual life story remains our 
chief semantic unit in efforts to make sense of the world.' The intellectual prestige of 
psychoanalysis has endured many vicissitudes in and out of the American academy, but its 
paradigms ind catch-phrases are perpetual money-makers, the stuff of a perdurable, reces- 
sion-proof franchise. The escalating recourse in the United States to "private life" as the 
measure of public aptitude testifies to a powerful social investment in the hermeneutic and 
moral power of biographical "experience." The hearings that ultimately produced the 
confirmation of Clarence Thomas as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court are 
a recent case in point. On the broadest public platform, in October, 1991, the post-Romantic 
politics of "authenticity" combined with the post-modem politics of auto- and ethnic biogra- 
phy to produce a high-stakes spectacle of competing and reciprocally discrediting subject 
projections.* A son of sharecroppers; a daughter of the working poor; family members and 
confidantes; co-workers and self-appointed "character witnesses"; White House handlers; 
Senators diversely bound by protocol, self-interest, backstage deals, reputations for laxness or 
libertinage, and "ideology"; the overdetermined specimens of Washington clientage and 
patronage: assembled to what end? To produce a television docudrama about contradictory 
narratives of desire. 
These narratives were ostensibly competing on the grounds of inherent plausibility and 
relevance, but far more salient was their vociferous promotion, their proliferative, insinua- 
tive, and diversionary instrumentality, their sheer capacity to occupy airtime and forensic 
space. Animating and animated by these narratives as they jockeyed for position (Did he do 
it? Whom did she tell? Why would she telephone? Was she liked? Whose sexual fantasies 
can John Doggett be said to have starred in?) was also a complex and recursive field of 
cultural assumptions about gender, professionalism, race, and class. Offscreen, in the closed- 
door drama of "advice and consent," the narratives of desire were no doubt differently named 
and differently inflected, but their collision manifestly produced a comparable amount of 
atmospheric noise. Despite allegations to the contrary, the much-deprecated "process" of 
inquiry was by no means a precipitous decline from sober debate-on-the-merits to partisan 
muckraking. Long before Anita Hill had been heard from, the Thomas nomination had been 
tactically structured around the slippery, reciprocal authentication of "justice" and "experi- 
ence." In lieu of juridical experience, the public was offered the (biographical) experience of 
youthful adversity. In lieu of a considered interpretive position on constitutional law, the 
public was offered a man who had "never discussed" one of the most controversial Supreme 
Court decisions (Roe v. Wade) of our era. At such a vanishing point, self-reliance is difficult 
to distinguish from self-fabrication. That the interlineations of "justice" and "experience" are 
manifold and manipulable was a lesson vividly encapsulated by the three-day, last-ditch, 
televised interpellation of Clarence Thomas, but the lesson is by no means unique to that 
portion of the spectacle. American public affairs are everywhere inscribed--and everywhere 
muddled--by the longing for a seamless narration of self. 
* 
The subject I look to here for leverage (and respite) is a pre-enlightenment one--the 
subject constituted by and within the Tudor state. The advantage of the Tudor subject, for 
my purposes, is that it exists across the great Romantic divide and can only return our own 
notions to us estranged. Early modem Englishmen thought of the subject as a constructed 
thing, a "creature." One was a creature of God; one might be the creature of a prince or 
some other mighty patron. Creatureliness as a concept possessed both theological and 
political valence and was firmly embedded in a hierarchical, indeed a patriarchal, understand- 
ing of creation. The sixteenth-century subject was not conceived as the locus of interiority 
but as a thing of radical and functional contingency. The'word subject (from the Latin sub, 
. or "under," and jacere, "to throw") in this period was indissolubly predicated upon subjec- 
tion, as the OED implacably testifies, and as Raymond Williams and Peter Stallybrass, among 
others, have lately reminded us.3 Williams and Stallybrass both insist upon the subject's 
grounding in patterns of dominance-and-subordination. Both are interested in the complex 
processes of inversion by which the subject and subjectivity acquired their more recent 
prestige. The watershed that interests Williams is that of German classical philosophy, which 
promoted the subject to its status as "the active mind or the thinking agent (in ironic contrast 
with the passive subject of political dominion)" (261). The watershed that interests Stally- 
brass is that of the English revolution "where, for the first time, the word 'individual' is 
explicitly used to displace the implication of subjection in the subject" (26). In either 
scenario, the subject begins as one who is under domination. In either scenario, in our 
common speech and common moralizing ("he treats her like an object"), the subject occupies 
the position of privilege. But on top or below, the subject is never outside the structure of 
subjection; the subject is always inflected by power. 
In his own account of subject formation, Louis Althusser invokes a similar structure of 
dominance and contingency. Althusser's announced project in "Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses (Notes towards an In~estigation)"~ is to refine previous Marxist accounts 
of the reproduction of labor power, a category that comprises physical bodies, a changing 
body of "skills," and a recursive process of "ideolo~ical subiection." "Ideology interpellates 
[hails, or calls forth] individuals as subjects. . . . By this I mean that, even if it only appears 
under this name (the subject) with the rise of bourgeois ideology . . . the category of the 
subject . . . is the constitutive category of all ideology" (170-71). Althusser has been justly 
criticized for his tendency to construe the interpellation of subjects from above. The 
functionalist question with which his essay begins (How do the relations of production 
reproduce themselves?) tends to produce a deterministic answer, one that scants the counter- 
hegemonic and contestatory contributions to social- and subject-formation. His class-based 
analysis of power and vested interest tends to obscure the ideological workings of other 
functional and symbolic groupings (race, sex, religion, ethnicity) whose imperfect alignments 
and instabilities now seem to many theorists to be indispensable to any account of social and 
ideological change.' 
Althusser insists that the formal structure he describes in "Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses" is a universal one: "the formal structure of all ideology is always the 
same" (177). He accordingly insists that his chief example of subject formation is an 
arbitrary and wholly typical one, chosen simply for its accessibility "to everyone" (177). But 
it is a measure of Althusser's theoretical richness--a sign that his answer has considerably 
complicated the original, functionalist question--that the example he chooses is that of "The 
Christian Religious Ideology," under which rubric he invokes (as does historical Christianity) 
figures from both Old and New Testaments. "And Moses, interpellated-called by his Name, 
having recognized that it 'really' was he who was called by God, recognizes that he is a 
subject, a subject of God, a subject subjected to God, a subiect through the Subiect and 
subiected to the Subject" (179). The authorizing Subject of Christianity is Word made Flesh. 
The authorized Christian subject is made in the Maker's likeness and recognizes himself in a - calling-by-name, or vocation. Interpellation has a specular structure; Althusser says as much 
'' (180). But for Althusser, this specularity is a closed circuit, a determined and deterministic 
process that simultaneously centers and subordinates the subject. "A subjected being, who 
submits to a higher authority, . . . is . . . stripped of all freedom except that of freely 
accepting his submission" (180, 182). Despite his documented admiration for Lacan 
(discussed below), in other words, Althusser clearly has trouble conceiving of the full 
generative role that Lacan assigns to specularity. But repression and containment, narrowly 
construed, will not adequately account for the subject whose very interpellation--whose 
ontological precariousness--provides the ground (the shifting ground) for hsubordination, 
which is to say for agency, and change. Endorsed by the transcendent, founded on secular - 
"interest," or founded on delusion of either kind, subject formation is a mirror trick. But it is 
a mirror trick that ~ o r k s . ~  
And history is likeness-with-difference. The Tudor subject was always a crux and an 
interpellation of power. Subject of, subject to, dependent upon: the concept was relational. 
The bourgeois subject, invent& precisely to obscure the workings of power, did not yet exist 
in-sixteenth-century England. The Cartesian subject, invented so that cognitive power might 
be dissociated from political power, so that "power," in all the material and social formations 
that interest us now, might be rendered epiphenomenal, the Cartesian subject had not yet 
thought itself into indispensability. Under the Tudor (and later, the Stuart) regime, Francis 
Bacon was busy founding a new epistemology, a modem "science" emboldened by the 
reformed religion, but Bacon's epistemology was grounded in a profound sense of the 
cognitive constraints upon subject status. Unlike Descartes, Bacon did not begin with and 
had no plans for the radical promotion of the subject. The man who fashioned himself "the 
servant and interpreter of Nature"' was all his life the servant and interpreter of factional 
court politics as well. He was deft, he was a survivor, he was keenly aware of what today 
we embrace as a truism: subject positions are not only contingent; they are multiple and 
overlapping. "I consider myself as a common," he once wrote, "and as much as is lawful to 
be enclosed of a common, so much your Lordship shall be sure to have."8 The Lord to 
whom Bacon addressed himself was his exuberant and dangerous patron, Robert Devereux, 
2nd Earl of Essex, who had some chronic trouble discerning what was lawful in a subject and 
eventually lost his life on account of it. Bacon, who was in every respect the subtler man, 
sometimes wrote for the Earl as well as to him. One of these scribal productions will be 
discussed at some length in the main body of this essay. Another was commissioned while 
the Earl was under house arrest after his impetuous return from Ireland in 1600. Attempting 
to reinstate Essex in the Queen's good graces, Bacon wrote a pair of letters, "as if' from 
Bacon's brother Anthony to Essex, and from Essex to Anthony Bacon in reply. These letters 
were to be "in secret manner showed to the Queen" as evidence of the Earl's dev~tion.~ "I 
know," wrote the ghost-written "Essex," "I ought doubly infinitely to be her Majesty's: both 
& creationis, for I am her creature, and & redemptionis, for I know she hath saved me 
from overthr~w."'~ My savior, my creator: the pattern invoked is explicitly the Christian 
subject formation described--albeit with irreverence--by Althusser. But the ever-precarious 
relation between Essex's "ought" and his performance is particularly vivid in the present 
instance. Called forth by a simulated correspondence--a ventriloquized dialogic--the specular 
creature of royal favor is "doubly infinitely" elusive. "I have spent more hours to make him 
a good subject to her Majesty," said the longsuffering Bacon, "than ever I spent in my own 
business. "" 
In a general theory of ideology, Althusser writes, the structure described will be 
transhistorical. It is the general theory that most interests Althusser. But every concrete 
subject--this is the corollary--is inextricably embedded in a complex matrix of cultural 
filiation. "Ideology has no history" (159, 171). But ideolo&--and the subjects they 
constitute--are inescapably historical. In an effort to recover some of the historical particulars 
of subject--and social--formation, I'm going to look in this essay at two cultural performanc- 
es. Both were among the most visible expressions of Elizabethan court culture. Both 
participated in and helped to codify the erotic discourse that defined and produced the late- 
Tudor courtly subject,'' that dominated Elizabethan court politics, and for decades shaped 
England's effort to formulate its national imperatives and international vulnerabilities. The 
first of these performances was written by Bacon and staged by the Earl of Essex in 1595. 
The second was published by Edmund Spenser in 1596. Both the Essex entertainment and 
The Faerie Oueen describe an explicitly specular structure of subject formation, upon which 
the larger movements of war, statecraft, philosophy, and justice depend. This foundational 
reflexivity may seem to anticipate Descartes, thinking about thinking. But the Elizabethans 
thought about the specular subject rather differently. One of their names for it was 
Narcissus. 
Some of the most interesting contemporary work on subjectconstruction has been 
done of late in gay and lesbian studies and has begun by denaturalizing and historicizing 
binary-coded cultural and psychological taxonomies based upon "sexual object choice," which 
is to say, upon the sex, narrowly construed as "same" or "different," of one's sexual 
partners. In E~istemologv of the Closet,13 Eve Sedgwick calls our attention to the broad 
cognitive, political, and affective implications of a regime that construes the "secret" of 
identity in such binary-coded terms. Where do you really put it when you put it to someone? 
What is it like to live in a culture that makes such a question the key to differential distribu- 
tions of public trust, enfranchisement, inheritance rights, and health care? In an earlier era, 
the question of property rights in female sexuality served as a comparable crux for morality, 
biological theory, the transfer of wealth, and social stability. In that earlier era--we might 
call them the centuries of the cuckold--male and female identity, but especially the male, was 
grounded in an obsessive focus on feminine chastity: Who's been there when you weren't 
looking? Who's had her in that secret place, and thus had you? I have written elsewhere 
about the hermeneutics of cuckoldry--a semiotic system that governed and produced what we 
now call "identity" during vast stretches of premodern and early modem Europe"--and about 
the circles of speculation, proprietary competition, and political faction that were organized 
by the scandal of the female body in sixteenth-century England. IS Here I propose to discuss 
some related inscriptions of social and erotic desire. "Sexual orientation," as the concept 
organizes twentieth-century subjectivities, cultural production, and political taxonomies, 
would be a concept quite unrecognizable to the author of The Faerie Oueene, but the 
metaphorics and the structures of erotic object choice are central to Spenser's interlocking 
renditions of dynastic imperative, narrative production, political authority, cognitive and 
social action. 
* 
On 17 November, 1595, Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, presented himself at 
the annual Accession Day Tilts by means of an allegorical vehicle that was elaborate even by 
the elaborate standard of Elizabeth's chief holiday. It was customary16 for tiltyard champi- 
ons to stage triumphal entrances, setting forth in their chariots and pageant cars, in compli- 
mentary speeches addressed to the Queen, and in the imprese with which their shields were 
ornamented a self-dramatizing tissue of praise and plaint and petition. When, for instance, 
the Earl of Cumberland was chafing at his failure to acquire the governorship of the Isle of 
Wight, he fashioned himself in the tiltyard as a Discontented Knight and threatened to retire 
from service to the monarchy.. When Sidney had been supplanted as heir to the Earl of 
Leicester by the recent birth of Leicester's son, he bore on his shield the device of Hope 
"dashed through."" Thwarted as he chronically felt himself to be in his own personal and 
public aspirations, Essex in 1595 presented a device or allegory "much comended"'* by the 
lookers-on and later described as "his darling piece of love and self-love. "I9 The device, 
composed in large part by Francis B a c ~ n , ~  unfolded in two sections: In front of the I 
dueen's viewing stand at Whitehall, where the tilters ordinarily presented themselves and 
delivered their im~rese, or emblematic shields, to the Queen, Essex's page pronounced a 
complimentary speech and was rewarded with the Queen's glove, which he in turn delivered 
to his master. Essex then made his entrance as Erophilus, the Knight of Love, his red and 
white costume emblazoned by the Queen's favor. He was met at the viewing stand by four 
characters, a Hermit, a Soldier, a Secretary of State, and his own Squire. The first three 
introduced themselves as followers of Philautia, or Self-Love, and attempted to win the 
Squire and thus his master to Philautia's cause. Having presented their tokens to the Squire 
and having endured interruption by virious subsidiary figures--a common postboy from 
London, winded and bemired; a blind Indian prince--Philautia's servants then retired with 
their burden of allegory for the duration of the tournament. And none too soon: Cumber- 
land, who had entered the tiltyard first in his capacity as Queen's Champion, had all this 
while been forced to play audience to his own upstaging. Sussex and the other tilters had 
been unceremoniously left to wait their turn outside the staging area. 
Following the tournament and the customary banquet, Essex's entertainment resumed 
indoors, where the Hermit, the Soldier, and the Secretary attempted to recruit Erophilus for 
the lives of meditation, martial fame, and policy respectively. Self-love, in other words, is 
construed in this allegory not chiefly as an affective or inward state but as a series of career 
moves, an outward, public promotion of the self-in-service. The choice confronting the 
Knight of Love is the choice between two derivations of service. Will the path of ambition 
be self-motivated and self-referential, or will it be mediated by the Queen's patronage? Will 
public and private labor be derived from the Queen's bounty and refer its progress back to 
her, or will profession take its shape from self-interest alone? The circulating compliment of 
courtly patronage harbors a shadowy threat: if the pace of preferment is insufficient to 
maintain the Queen's subjects in expectation, vocation will be centrifugal, subjection 
dispersed. The debate among the servants of Philautia and the Squire of Love is largely a 
debate about referentiality, or competing constructions of shadow and substance. The 
Soldier, for instance, praises War as the summary event that renders all other forms of action 
and virtue but pallid imitations: the muses are handmaidens to the man of war and sing his 
praises; huntsmen, athletes, and tragedians but counterfeit the exemplary action of the 
battlefield; even Lovers "never [think] their profession sufficiently graced, till they have 
compared it to a Warfare."Z' The Secretary, a transparent burlesque of Essex's great 
antagonist Burghley," makes a speech that sounds like an early draft for Polonius: Squire, 
he advises, let thy master "not trouble himself too laboriously to sound into any matter 
deeply, or to execute any thing exactly; but let himself make himself cunning rather in the 
humours and drifts of persons, than in the nature of business and affairs. . . . Let him follow 
the wisdom of oracles, which utterred that which might ever be applied to the event. . . . To 
conclude, let him be true to himself . . . ."" Predictably enough, the Squire ultimately 
rejects the blandishments of Self-Love in favor of continued service to the Queen, upon 
whose kind regard and rich patronage the self-promoting Lover thus offers to throw himself. 
"My Master's condition," explains the Squire, "seemeth to'depend, as the globe of the earth 
seemeth to hang, in the air; but yet it is firm and stable in itself. . . . Is he denied the hopes 
of favours to come? He can resort to the remembrance of contentments past. . . . Doth he 
find the acknowledgement of his affection small? He may find the merit of his affection the 
greater . . . . His falls are like the falls of Antaeus; they renew his strength . . . such is the 
excellency of her nature, and of his estate."= Notwithstanding these courtly affectations of 
indifference to worldly measures of advancement, the psychic economies of knightly petition 
are clear: a marginal note in Bacon's hand explains that it is nothing less than "the Queen's 
unkind dealing which may persuade you to self-love. "z 
Bacon knew whereof he spoke. The most immediate insult to Essex's prestige had 
been the matter of the Queen's solicitor-generalship. Essex had for some torturous months 
pitted his personal influence against the full weight of the Cecil faction by promoting Francis 
Bacon first, and unsuccessfully, for the position of attorney general, then for the newly 
vacated position of solicitor general. The Queen's young favorite was not one to hedge his 
bets. "The attorneyship for Francis," he wrote to Robert Cecil, "is that I must have, and in 
that will I spend all my power, might, authority and annuity, and with tooth and nail defend 
and procure the same for him against whosoever; and that whosoever getteth this office out of 
my hand for another, before he have it it shall cost him the coming by."26 Despite these 
heroics, Essex was flatly denied preferment for his protegC; the patent of office for solicitor 
general was granted to Sir Thomas Fleming on 5 November, 1595, just 12 days prior to 
Accession Day. 
The ceremonial rhetoric of the tiltyard and the banqueting hall had to be considerably 
more elastic than Essex's defiant letter to Cecil, if only because its audience was heteroge- 
neous. The Accession Day entertainment addressed itself directly to the Queen, by dumb- 
show to a large mixed public (common citizens might and thousands did gain access to the 
tiltyard for the admission price of one shilling), and at greater length to a factionalized group 
of courtiers, a group that included the Earl's allies and rivals alike (Burghley, ill, was absent 
from the festivities in 1595, but his son Robert Cecil was present). In Essex's device, 
Philautia is explicitly represented as the Queen's competitor, a lover's last recourse if the 
Queen prove too unkind. But Philautia is also implicitly equated with the Queen in her 
withholding humour. This equation is shadowed in the ambiguous feminine pronouns of the 
Squire's final speech on behalf of Erophilus: 
Therefore Erophilus's resolution is fixed: he renounceth Philautia, and all her 
inchantments. For her recreation he will confer with his Muse: for her defence and 
honour, he will sacrifice his life in the wars, hoping to be embalmed in the sweet 
odours of her remembrance. To her service will he consecrate all his watchful 
endeavours, and will ever bear in his heart the picture of her beauty; in his actions, of 
her will; and in his fortune, of her grace and favour. 
(Nichols, 379) 
In every sentence but the first, the pronomial referent is Elizabeth: Erophilus refuses the 
blandishments of Philautia's servants while appropriating their vocational spheres, choosing to 
derive vocation from the Queen. But Erophilus's "resolution" requires the endorsement of 
his putative patroness; he is "fiked" upon hope, whose fulfillment rests with "her." To the 
Queen, in her bounty, Erophilus offers to dedicate his Muse, his life in the wars, his watchful 
endeavor. But if the Queen refuses to fill the place that a hopeful pronoun sets aside for her, 
her subject is condemned to &me Philautia, who is at once the fallback pronomial referent 
and the fallback patroness. Love and self-love are bound by the specula logic of subjectivi- 
ty: in his fortune may be seen the picture of her face, or "favour. " 
Underscoring the work of slippery pronoun reference in Essex's device is the work of 
gendered allegory. Though love's outward vocation is doubly inscribed as male--Eros, 
Philus--love's inward collapse is conspicuously female--Philautia. In Minerva Britanna; 
Henry Peacham catalogues a number of imprese known to have been used on Accession Day; 
among the imprese he prints is a figure of Phila~tia,~' who gazes into a mirror, her back 
turned to the symbols of commerce and community. The figure's breasts are bared, no doubt 
betokening an exhibitionist strain (and contemporary observers have taught us to associate a 
flagrant display of bosom with England's aging Virgin Q ~ e e n ) ~  but suggesting too the 
bounty and nurture that excessive self-regard sequesters from proper use or circulation. A 
Queen who is too niggardly of her favors does not merely throw her courtiers into the arms 
of Philautia; she Philautia. The default identification is a thwarted suitor's small revenge. 
But Bacon was required to hold his own against an overenthusiastic. patron as well as 
against a tightfisted Queen, and he knew danger even when it championed his cause. "I 
desire your Lordship . . . to think," he warily wrote, "that though I confess I love some 
things much better than I love your Lordship, as the Queen's service, her quiet and content- 
ment, her honour, her favour, the good of my country, and the like, yet I love few persons 
better than yourself, both for gratitude's sake, and for your own virtues, which cannot hurt 
but by accident or abuse."29 He also wrote in Essex's service the "darling piece of love and 
self-love." Inscribed by Bacon, Erophilus is overdetermined. Eros and Philus conflated 
make Essex a lover of amorousness, a lover who loves his own motions better than he loves 
his mistress, or his cause, or the rules of state and decorum.% Erophilus in his excess 
reproduces the self-constituting gaze of Philautia. 
The derivation of subjectivity and public career from erotic paradigm was not unique 
to Essex, of course, but was in fact the dominant trope of courtly patronage in Elizabethan 
England. While the Petrarchan poet constructed both subjectivity and public ambition in a 
discursive model of de~ire,~'  the Elizabethan courtier simultaneously declared his subjection 
and sued for patronage (subjects must have maintenance) in a Petrarchan address to the 
Queen.32 Love in this construct is not so much a thing one feels but a thing one does; the 
object of desire defines a course of ambition, Laura and the laurel perpetually conflated. 
Having lately clipped the wings of her impetuous favorite, Elizabeth in the tiltyard on 17 
November, 1595, at the dawn of the 38th year of her reign, seemed prepared to take the 
young man back into her graces: she sent him her glove as a token. But after spending the 
better part of her evening on this business of Self-Love, she was less conciliatory, remarking 
"that if she had thought their had bene so moch said of her, she wold not haue bene their that 
Night, and soe went to Bed."33 
* 
When Spenser published the second installment of The Faerie Oueene in 1596, he 
introduced the new books with stanzas that are commonly read as a reproach to Burghley, 
who had proved no more sympathetic to England's chief poet than to England's chief 
romantic hero, the Earl of Essex. Those "that cannot loue," writes Spenser, can little 
understand love's seminal .role in epic action and philosophy. "[A111 the workes of those wise 
sages, / And braue exploits which great Heroes wonne, / In loue were either ended or 
begunne" (IV Proem 2,3)." For his pattern and chief reader, the poet takes one "that loueth 
best, 1 And best is lou'd of all aliue" (IV Proem 4), his Queen. But before she can read the 
lesson locked in her own "chast breast," Elizabeth must be freed from "vse of awful1 
Maiestie" (IV Proem 4, 5). The Queen is thus invited to behold her own image in the mirror 
of the poem; that image differs from Philautia's by being oblique, by requiring the remedial 
mediation of the poet.35 
Spenser proposes a similar specular contract at the outset of Book VI, where etymolo- 
gy--"Of Court it seemes, men Courtesie doe call" (VI i 1)--rehearses a model of cultural 
production: courtesy in action circulates the image of the court. "From your selfe I doe this 
vertue bring, / And to your selfe doe it returne againe," writes the poet to his Monarch (VI 
Proem 7). Virtues ring about her person as do the lords and ladies who adorn her Court, 
"where courtesies excell" (VI Proem 7). But Spenser's Proem is so conspicuously at odds 
with itself as to discredit any such sanguine pattern. The present age is an age of corruption, 
we read; virtue lies hidden; courtesy "is nought but forgerie, / Fashion'd to please the eies of 
them, that pas, / Which see not perfect things but in a glas" (VI Proem 5).M The paradig- 
ma, or mirror of courtesy, is revealed as the darkened, distorting glass of Pauline epistle. So 
the poet must attribute to his Lady Queene a "selfe" from which he will derive the lost 
pattern, a selfe "in whose pure minde, as in a mirrour sheene" (VI Proem 6) the,paradigm 
may be rediscovered. Not the court as it exists, then, but a court ascribed to the inwardness 
of the Queen, who is thus made subject of and to the Book of Courtesy. Between the 
distorting glass of a fallen, "passing" age and the flattering glass of poetic praise opens up a 
space for didactic fable. 
Epic action begins with a gaze in the mirror. When Spenser thematizes the gaze, he 
inscribes Eros as a species of reformed narcissism, the closed embrace broken to allow for 
the discursive path of knightly "error" (errare, to ~ander).~' In The Faerie Oueene Book 
III, the Knight of Chastity steals into her father's closet and consults a magic glass, endowed 
by Merlin with prophetic powers. Looking for the future, she sees, "as maydens vse to 
done" (III ii 23), a knight in shining armor. The instrument that has alerted her father the 
king to advancing enemies and incipient treasons modulates into "Venus looking glas" (111 i 
8) and alerts his daughter to invasions of another sort. But this is all in the course of 
Britomart's second gaze. The first face she sees in the glass is her own, and the second face- 
-the likeness revised--is elusive: the figure that will govern desire and the narrative action 
spun from desire is a figure she must largely, and in her own person, invent. 
Jacques Lacan tells a similar story about the emergence of symbolic agency. In his 
formulation of a cognitive "mirror stage,"38 Lacan proposes that the child without language-- 
the infans--begins its libidinal and linguistic maturation with a double gaze in a mirror. At 
first the infant believes that the figure in the glass is another; when slhe comes to "recognize" 
the figure as another &f, the infant invests that self with all the psychic and physical 
autonomy the infant lacks and longs for. The evolution of desire begins in narcissism: the 
self discovered in a reflection comes to govern all the multiple cathexes around which 
subjectivity forms. Each subsequent object of desire will be an approximation of the figure in 
the glass, receiving its aura from memory. Of course, the perfected, autonomous self has no 
more a priori existence than does the illusory "other." The self and the figure in the glass 
are reciprocally constituted by error, are "recognized" as always already existing. "Error, " 
says-Lam, "is the habitual incarnation of the truth. "39 
The political implications that attend this derivation of subjectivity have not been lost 
on some of Lam's  most influential readers. "All ideology," writes Louis Althusser, "has 
the function (which defines it) of 'constituting' concrete individuals as subjects." "Ideology," 
moreover, "has a material existence. "" Lacan's mirror has a material existence, though we 
would do better to look for it in the concrete practices of class, ethnic, and nationalist 
identification than in the infinite suggestibility of silver- or amalgam-backed polished glass. 
Althusser has argued that Lacan and Saussurean linguistics throw an indispensable light on 
the true subject of Freudian theory, and he writes thus of the Freud restored to us by Lacan: 
"Freud has discovered for us that . . . the human subject is decentred, constituted by a 
structure which has no 'centre' either, except in the imaginary misrecognition of the 'ego,' 
i.e. in the ideological formations in which it 'recognizes' itself. . . . This structure of 
misrecognition . . . is of particular concern for all investigations into ide~logy."~' 
In The Faerie Oueene the subject and its etiology are explicitly rendered on a civic 
scale: subjectivity and national destiny both evolve around an interpolated otherness, a 
second, "better" likeness that translates into vocation. Once the self in the mirror has been 
withdrawn and proleptically reconstructed, epic--or civil--action depends for its continuance 
upon a deferred or suppressed recognition scene. It is this pattern of oblique or occluded 
likeness--this structure of misrecognition--and its constitutive role for Spenser's political 
narrative that I wish to trace in the later books of The Faerie Oueene. 
The first installment of The Faerie Oueene (1590) ended with the embrace of reunited 
lovers: "Had ye them seene, ye would haue surely thought, 1 That they had beene that faire 
Hermaphrodite" (111 xii 46; 1590)' so closely are Amoret and Scudamour intertwined (their 
names--linked by amor--have always been so). But in the second edition of The Faerie 
Oueene (1596) the hermaphroditic embrace is broken to make way for the second half of 
Spenser's poem, and the poem never achieves this version of closure again. In the wake of 
the broken embrace, specular deferrals and suppressions are legion: Britomart fails to 
recognize the knight in the glass when she meets him on the tournament field; Belphoebe fails 
to recognize her wounded twin sister; Arthur fails to recognize his lovesick Squire; Scuda- 
mour fails to recognize his "virgin bride" after a long a tumultuous separation (unless the 
lapse is more extreme, and the narrator simply fails to recognize that he has brought his 
newlyweds together again)." What distinguishes these patterns from comparable patterns in 
earlier books of The Faerie Oueene, apart from their sheer number, is the increase of violent 
intervention. Most notably, two strategic beheadings in Book V preempt the recognition 
scenes--between Britomart and Radigund, Mercilla and Duessa, female figures all--that 
disastrously threaten the political agenda of Spenserian Justice. 
Britomart's first double gaze in the looking glass plunges her into despair: "Nor man 
it is, nor other liuing wight . . . But th'only shade and semblant of a knight . . . Hath me 
subjected to loues cruel1 law" (III ii 38). "Why make ye, " says her nurse, "such Monster of 
your mind?" (m I11 ii 40). Monstrosity is an analytical concept as well as a recumng figure 
in The Faerie Oueene; the deformations that make a monster in this poem may be ethical, 
cognitive, political, or erotic in origin and import. In the present instance, in the counsel of a 
superstitious, commonsensical, stereotypical old nurse, those deformations are figured--and 
implicitly theorized--in erotic terms. The amatory monstrosities Glauce itemizes for Brito- 
mart at the beginning of Book 111 ("Of much more vncouth thing I was affrayd") are those 
versions of .lust.that work "contrarie vnto kind" by.abrogating the proper distance that ought 
to obtain between lover. and beloved. So Pasiphae, to take one of Glauce's examples, played 
a "monstrous part" by loving a bull, a creature too remote from kind. So Biblis, who loved a - 
brother, iind Myrrha, .who loved a father, became monstrous by fixing desire on kindred, 
who are too close. 
Glauce resorts to figures of monstrosity--all of them derived from Ovid--in order to 
reassure Britomart that her own infatuation is, by contrast, legitimate. But Britomart is not 
consoled. If an excess of "kindness" between lover and beloved makes desire unnatural or 
"unkind" in its radical sense, what of the absorption that is closer than incest? It is Britomart 
who presses this erotic economy to its logical limit and compares her own case to that of 
Narcissus: "I fonder, then Cephisus foolish child, . . . I fonder loue a shade, the bodie farre 
exild" (I11 ii 44). Narrower still than the circuit of incestuous desire is the circuit of self- 
love. More outlandish than bestiality is the love that links a woman of manifest narrative 
presence and dynastic consequence (if not of flesh and blood) to a phantom. Britomart is 
dismayed to find herself in thrall to a creature who is at once too remote (of incommensurate 
ontological--or representational--status) and too proximate (a product of her own imagination, 
or another self). "1 . . . loue a shadem--an image--"the body farre exild." To which Glauce 
at last responds with pragmatic advice, her long suit: "No shadow," she staunchly advises, 
"but a bodie hath in powre" (I11 ii 45). Britomart does not fret about the syntactical ambigu- 
ity (which is it, exactly, that has the other in its power?); she turns this ambiguity into 
narrative action. Determined now to arm and seek the knight in the mirror, Britomart 
becomes a knight herself, unfolding the shadow's double corporeality. Breaking the specular 
entrapment of self-love, she makes desire the motive force of epic quest. Narcissism, 
reformed, is the inception of agency." 
Needless to say (or nearly), the specter of erotic monstrosity continues to haunt 
Chastity's progress. In the House of Busirane, lush tapestries and walls of beaten gold 
anthologize the manifold varieties of monstrous mingling--a maiden with a bull, a maiden 
with a ram, a maiden with a serpent, a maiden with a swan, a maiden with a shower of gold- 
-"for loue in thousand monstrous formes doth oft appeare" (111 xi 51). In the Temple of Isis, 
Britomart dreams she is impregnated by a crocodile and gives birth to a lion (V vii 16). A 
priestly exegete discerns in these bestial tropes an allegorical account of dynastic succession, 
but his serial equations imperfectly contain the "vncouth" vistas opened up by the dream. 
The unthinkable leaves a residue. Far from being banished by authorized interpretation, the 
radical "unkindness" Glauce once described as an antitype to love's legitimate quest continues 
to shadow that quest from canto to canto. Love's progress takes place as an increasingly 
subtle negotiation with prohibited analogues. 
In Radigund, Britomart encounters just that monster of inversion she has feared to 
behold in the glass: a woman who prefers her own sex to the other and who falls in love 
with the image of her own abjection, with Arthegall in drag. Unlacing Radigund's helmet 
and taking pity on what he beholds, Arthegall has abandoned knightly prerogative and 
submitted to the "shame" of feminine dress and feminine occupation." While Spenser's 
Knight of Justice thus lapses from his proper "semblance" (V vii 41) in the middle of his 
quest, Britomart upholds that semblance by means of a corrective surrogacy. Britomart has 
throughout the middle books of The Faerie Oueene negotiated a double lineage. She has 
adopted the armor and the example of an enemy (of the Saxon warrior Angela) in order to 
invent a beloved foe who will become protector and progenitor of her native race. She has 
revived the lineage of female warriors in order to defend the prerogatives of patriarchy. Her 
battle-with Radigund has been twice rehearsed--once in the battle between herself and 
Arthegall, once in the battle between Arthegall and the Amazon. In each case, the unveiling 
of the feminine face has been fatal to martial action. But just at that juncture on the battle- 
field where Radigund's helmet would conventionally be unlaced, disrupting dynastic impera- 
tive with the reciprocal gaze of gendered common cause or with pity, which has waylaid 
Arthegall two cantos earlier and will waylay Arthur at Duessa's trial two cantos hence, 
Britomart "with one stroke both head and helmet cleft[sIw (V vii 34). She cuts off the 
recognition scene that Elizabethan sovereignty will not bear. She cuts off too the abominable 
precdent of the Amazonian state: 
And changing all that forme of common weale, 
The liberty of women did repeale, 
Which they had long vsurpt; and them restoring 
To mens subiection, did true Iustice deale. 
(V vii 42)" 
Britomart restores the body politic to its "proper" shape by insisting that liberty and subjec- 
tion are gendered attributes: she separates male from female, legitimate freedom from 
"vsurpt." Redivided and regrouped around a venerable asymmetry of power, "all" members 
of the commonwealth adore their conquering Reformer and treat her "as a Goddesse" (V vii 
42). Britomart reconstructs true Justice as a man, and he promptly leaves her. 
Spenser waves the flag of patriarchy, as did his female monarch, at particularly trying 
juncturesf6 the allegory that attempts to distinguish a political and erotic career from 
outlandishness on the one hand and excessive inbreeding or narcissism on the other. is fraught 
with tribulation. The very partner who will bind Britomart to conjugal and dynastic service 
himself wanders among strangers and is materially elusive: 
Ne soothlich is it easie for to read, 
Where now on earth, or how he may be found; 
For he ne wonneth in one certaine stead, 
But restlesse walketh all the world around . . . 
(13.1 ii 14) 
Like Redcrosse Knight and Prince Arthur, like the Earl of Essex and the self-styled laureate 
Edmund Spenser, Arthegall makes his place in the commonwealth while serving, or improvis- 
ing, the interests and imperatives of that commonwealth abroad. Arthegall's expatriation 
dates back to his infancy, when he was abducted by the demigoddess Astraea and taught to 
practice justice among wild animals (among people, justice is harder to administer). 
Britomart's task is to repatriate the changeling Knight of Justice so that he may defend his 
homeland, now estranged, against invaders. Having "invented," or discovered, her knight in 
a glass, Britomart must "invent" him in another sense: must conjure the body that the 
shadow "hath in powre" (I11 ii 45). And here is where excessive kinship rivals excessive 
strangeness as a peril to her quest. The knight that "fittest she for loue could find" (I11 ii 14) 
is a knight whose image she advances and preserves in her own person, as "in a glas," even 
when he allows his own likeness to lapse (V vii 38, discussed above), a knight whose 
confirmed narrative presence she greets with the joy of a newly delivered mother (I11 ii 11). 
-The self-confirming circle of specular precipitation threatens to become no more than a 
.delusory mirror trick; the second, exogamous likeness in the glass, to become no more than 
another version of the narcissistic first. Britomart "makes" the man she loves, makes him 
and her "selfe" in a single mold, the lady and the knight incorporate. Pygmalion and 
Narcissus are after all consanguineous, as anyone may read in Ovid's Metamorphoses. 
In thrall to an Amazon, Arthegall assumes the abjection of women's clothing and 
women's work. When Britornart makes her way to his prison and beholds the state of "her 
owne hue"--a beloved and a love in which self and other, man and woman, "proper" and 
imposed are confounded--she turns her head aside in "secrete shame" (V vii 38). She 
"revives" only when she has clothed her knight anew, restoring him to "manly hew" and 
"semblance glad" (V vii 40-41). Turning from her lover's body natural to the Amazonian 
body politic, encountering in the "common weale" the same "disfiguring" and "unnatural" 
dislocation of normative attributes she has encountered in the imprisoned knight, Britomart 
emphatically reasserts the old hierarchical organization of gender, an organization manifestly 
problematized by her own allegorical career.47 
* 
The hermaphroditic embrace with which the 1590 ~ a e h e  Oueene concludes is broken 
to allow for epic's continuing action. Amoret and Scudamour are never so decisively 
reunited again, but the figure they once made is dispersed and displaced throughout the 
longer Faerie Oueene. A hermaphroditic Venus presides over the story Scudamour tells in 
place of recognizing Amoret in the Book of Friendship (IV x 41). A double Idol--Isis/Osyris, 
manlwife, sisterlbrother, maidenlbeast--presides over Britomart's vision in the Temple of Isis 
(V vii 6). An inscrutable Nature--endowed by veils and rumor with attributes that are both 
male and female, beautiful and terrible--presides over the trial of Mutability (VII vii 5-6). 
Despite the imperfectly absorbed and domesticated terror these figures imply, Venus, 
IsisIOsyris, and Nature function in these scenes as beneficent deities, signifying plenitude. 
But when the double sex unveils and assumes an explicitly political contour--as when 
Radigund's person and Radigund's state threaten the reciprocal unfolding of gendered 
Chastity and gendered Justice, Britain's vested disposition of property rights--Spenser marks 
the double sex for destruction. 
A case in point is the "monster" that lives beneath the altar of idolatry in the occupied 
Netherlands. Monstrously compounded--with the face of a maiden, the voice of a man, the 
body of a dog, a lion's claws, a dragon's tail, an eagle's wings--this creature feeds on the 
carcasses of sacrificial victims (V x 29, V xi 20) and signifies the Spanish Inquisition (V x 
27). Like ~ r r o i  in the Book of Holiness, she takes the feminine pronoun and she discharges 
homfying effluvia from her "hellish sinke" or "wombe" (I i 22, V xi 31). Ever ready to 
seize upon an antipapist pun, Spenser calls her a "deformed Masse" (V xi 32). Prince Arthur 
kills her when he liberates the Lowlands. Thus far, Spenser's propaganda contribution to the 
international Protestant cause seems clear, if overwrought: the Inquisition, ostensibly 
mobilized to root out doctrinal error, in fact feeds upon and propagates error; its role is 
predatory. 
More complex hermeneutically are the monster's explicit links to the Theban Sphinx 
and to the story of Oedipus: 
Much like in foulnesses and deformity 
: Vnto that Monster, whom the Theban Knight, 
T The Father of that fatall progeny, 
5 Made kill her selfe for very hearts despight, 
.- That he had red her Riddle, which no wight 
Could euer loose, but suffred deadly doole. 
So also did this Monster vse like slight 
- To many a one, which came vnto her schoole, 
m o m  she did put to death, deceiued like a foole. 
(V xi 25) 
-. 
Among the faults of the Inquisition, Spenser's allegory implies, is to inquire too closely into 
conscience. Whatever the answer it elicits--a losing or a "loosing" one--the Inquisitor's 
"schoole" is deadly. In England, the Elizabethan Settlement had been specifically designed to 
avoid such overscrupulous examination. When a 1563 statute prescribed execution for a 
second refusal of the supremacy oath, the Queen ordered her archbishop to ensure that no 
one was asked to take the oath twice." On matters pertaining to the interrogation of the 
Reformation subject, or the "commandment of men's faiths," Francis Bacon glossed her 
actions thus: 
Her majesty (not liking to make windows into men's hearts and secret thoughts, 
except the abundance of them did overflow into overt and express acts and 
affirmations,) tempered her law so, as it restraineth only manifest disobedience in 
impugning and impeaching advisedly and maliciously her Majesty's supreme power, 
and maintaining a foreign juri~diction.'~ 
We have some sense of Spenser's attitude toward "foreign jurisdiction" in the British 
sphere, but to what extent did he endorse ~lizabeth's circumspection in the matter of private 
faith? The Elizabethan Settlement had proved a bitter disappointment to Protestant Reformers 
in England, a half-measure whose apparently ad hoc nature gradually hardened into an 
unacceptable new order as, decade after decade, Elizabeth refused to tamper with the 
substance of a compromise enacted during the first years of her reign. (And when she drew 
a hard line, as in the matter of ecclesiastical vestments, it was as likely as not to be on the 
side of tradition.) Among Spenser's patrons were England's chief exemplars of Protestant 
chivalry: Sidney received his death wound fighting against Catholic Spain at the battle of 
Zutphen; Leicester commanded the English forces in the Lowlands with considerable pomp 
and was for a time installed as governor there; Essex challenged the Spaniards at Lisbon to 
single combat in the name of his mistress, he led the English capture of Cadiz, and as 
governor-general he waged war in Ireland. But the militancy of these powerful men was 
much more conspicuous in matters of foreign policy than in matters of ecclesiastical reform. 
And their campaign to advance the cause of international Protestantism is difficult to distin- 
guish from their campaigns for personal ad~ancement.~" 
Spenser's stakes in the Reformation of Western Christendom are neither clearer than 
those of his patrons nor necessarily consistent: he contrives an allegory that seems to 
commend both his sovereign's tacit domestic policy (don't ask if you don't want to hear the 
answer) and the more militant foreign policy that others envisioned for her. When Elizabeth 
finally committed English troops to the defense of the Netherlands in 1585, a move she had 
been resisting for nine years, she explained her decision as an effort to protect the Dutch 
from an Inquisition, but "this," writes Christopher Haigh, "was a propaganda smoke- 
screen. "" Spenser's parable about the Sphinx of the Inquisition inevitably highlights the 
problematic intersections of private conscience and state violence. If the parable plays fast 
and loose with sixteenth-century history, what is the History it prefers? Prince Arthur 
answers the Sphinx not with words but, emphatically, with the sword. Prince Arthur was, or 
will be, a consummate British hero, but the Faerie Queene who makes him so is manifestly 
the stuff of  dream^.'^ 
According to legend, the Sphinx's riddle was as heterogeneous as her person.s3 
Oedipus was able to answer the Sphinx's riddle because in the figure of monstrous admixture 
(What walks on four legs in the morning, two legs at noon, and three legs in the evening?) he 
recognized the diachronic parable of the human, recognized, that is to say, a version of the 
self. The punishment for answering the monster's riddle is to fulfill the correlative riddle of 
the monstrous self: rewarded with a kingdom, the parricide sleeps with his mother and 
engenders a "fatal" and incestuous progeny. As Tiresias prophecies in Oedi~us Rex: 
,He shall be proved father and brother both 
to his own children in his house; to her 
that gave him birth, a son and husband both; 
a fellow sower in his father's bed 
with that same father that he murdered." 
Completing the structure of overdetermination, the unnatural father, brother, and son shall 
leave his native city blinded, "tapping his way before him with a stick" (36). He shall leave, 
that is, on three legs." Tiresias, blind himself, knows a blind man when he sees one. In 
Ovid we may read about the prophecy that first .made Tiresias famous: asked to reveal the 
fate of Narcissus, Tiresias foretold that the boy would thrive as long as he "did not know 
himself," "si se non noverit. "% (The Latin verb--noscere--means to recognize or merely, 
and more ominously, to inquire into). In Sophocles, Tiresias also prophecies a fatal 
recognition scene: when he knows himself, says the prophet, the king shall know himself to 
be the enemy. Oedipus is Narcissus made political, made civic, made a matter of collective 
destiny. Between one recognition scene (answering the riddle of the Sphinx) and the next. 
(answering the riddle of prophecy: I am the incestuous parricide) is the space for monarchic 
succession, the space for a kingdom to sicken, to be rescued, and to sicken again." 
Book Five of The Faerie Oueene is the book in which Spenser's allegory works most 
strenuously to accommodate history. Spenser's Book of Justice augments the habitual 
ungainliness of pastoral-historical, comical-allegorical, epic Petrarchan romance (Polonius 
might be his publicist) with an unprecedented burden of political propaganda. Specifically 
Spenser undertakes to render the recent history of Britain's erratic struggle against Catholic 
forces in France and the Lowlands and the largely botched colonial subjection of Ireland as a 
parable about the triumph of international Protestantism. This necessitates a great deal of 
tactical amnesia. 
Alan Liu has reminded us of late that the structure of historical inquiry is by its very 
nature circular: "Historical explanation, in order to be satisfying, must at some point round 
back to tautology."" The historical subject submits himself to the discipline of the temporal 
other, the material elsewhere, only to discern at last the lineaments of the impending or the 
alternative self. If historiography assesses itself by means of its capacity to account for 
change, this simply means that the recognition scene of history occurs by way of a long and 
complex circuit of defarniliarization. History writes itself as rigorous digression, so that the 
recognition scene, when it comes, comes with the force of discovery and plausibility. 'The. 
home we find in the narrative we make has to convince us that it is something more than the 
short circuh of solipsism. To "recognize" the self in the subject of history is to invent the 
self as part of a collective, and as memory. We turn to the past in order to put a face on the 
future. 
Those who wished to know history while it was still the future might at one time go to 
Delphi, where the oracle spoke diversely to diverse inquirers. But "Know thyself," read the 
Delphic inscription, always the same. What kind of self is it that the Delphic inscription 
posits? Spenser's answer, like Bacon's, and like Shakespeare's, was less sentimental than our 
own." In the Essex entertainment of 1596, the Statesman quite frankly equates self-knowl- 
edge with self-interest, and is willing to let the whole edifice of knowledge and power rest on 
the narrow foundation of tautology: 
For himself [Erophilus], let him set for matters of commodity and strength, though 
they be joined with envy. Let him not trouble himself too laboriously to sound into 
any matter deeply, or to execute any thing exactly; but let himself make himself 
cunning rather in the humours and drifts of persons, than in the nature of business and 
affairs. . . . In his counsels . . . let him follow the wisdom of the oracles, which 
utterred that which might ever be applied to the event. . . . To conclude, let him be 
true to h im~elf .~  
Like Polonius, whose counsel to another young-man-on-the-make will bear distinct traces of 
this counsel to Essex/Erophilus, Bacon's Statesman outlines a species of worldly opportunism 
that rests upon a cipher. The "self' that defines truth-in-action, that gives motive and shape 
and organizing telos to "service," is a place-holder, a structural necessity, perfectly sub- 
stanceless. In Bacon's text, the very oracles are hedging opportunists: their "wisdom" 
amounts to no more than a canny circularity; their utterances "might ever be applied to the 
event. " 
To cast Polonius and the Statesman as parodic figures is to imply that their construc- 
tions of truth and of self (the thing one is somehow true to) are not the only ones, that 
somewhere there exists a philosophy or a praxis of which theirs is the mere burlesque. In 
Bacon's speculative and political writings, scientific project and public affairs are at once the 
making and the release from self. The self is indistinguishable from its career, but in a sense 
quite opposite to that of Philautia's Statesman or-Shakespeare's Polonius. The self is 
contingent, the creature of an order that exceeds it. The "truth" of the self, insofar as Bacon 
would recognize such a concept, depends upon its own distrust of preemptive recognition 
scenes. 
Bacon is often invoked as the father of positivism or "scientific method," but the 
project Bacon proposed, in writings like The Advancement of Learning and The New 
Organon, is considerably more provisional and more poignant than the legacy of the Royal 
Society would suggest. Bacon was convinced that human cognition was at odds with human 
cognitive equipment, that the tools we have to see with are ill suited to vision, as likely to 
impede as to facilitate understanding, that the human appetite for shapeliness of sentence and 
of theory is a preemptive appetite, one that obscures understanding. His notion of scientific 
method thus involves the repeated rupturing of the self and its scripted meanings or "idols," a 
dogged undermining of the ground upon which we stand and seem to ourselves to understand. 
As a key player in the political and patronage systems of the late Tudor and early Stuart 
monarchies, Bacon had perforce to evolve a theatrical or performative notion of human 
agency. Bacon's natural and political philosophies derive their daunting momentum, I would 
argue, from what he perceives to be the reciprocal inaptitudes of self and knowledge. Action 
is vanity's antidote, say the writings, and action is also the better vanity. 
In & Sapientia Veterum, or The Wisdom of the Ancients (1609), Bacon's immensely 
popular moralization of ancient myths and fables, the author devotes his fourth interpretation 
to "Narcissus, or Philautia (Self-Love)." Those who "fall in love as it were with them- 
selves," writes Bacon, are those who fail to mature into civic life: 
With this state of mind there is commonly joined an indisposition to appear much in 
public or engage in business . . . . Therefore they commonly live a solitary, private, 
and shadowed life; with a small circle of chosen companions, all devoted admirers . . 
. till being by such habits gradually depraved and puffed up, and besotted at last with 
self-admiration, they fall into such a sloth and listlessness that they grow utterly 
stupid, and lose all vigour and alacrity. And it was a beautiful thought to choose the 
flower of spring as an emblem of characters like this: characters which in the opening 
of their career flourish and are talked of, but disappoint in maturity the promise of 
their youth. . . . men of this disposition turn out utterly useless and good for nothing 
whatever; and anything that yields no fruit, but like the way of a ship in the sea passes 
and leaves no trace, was by the ancients held sacred to the shades and infernal 
gods? 
De Sapientia Veterum was first published in 1609, eight years after Essex's death. It reads, -
on one of its faces, as a belated valediction to Bacon's former mentor, the dashing young 
courtier who flourished so magnificently under Elizabeth, only to withdraw into a circle of 
flatterers and conspirators at Essex House during the last year of his life. It was of course 
more politic than accurate to suggest that the Earl's spectacular decline was a motion that left 
"no trace. " 
Burlesque is not the only perspective from which the autonomous self seems to 
dissolve. The self Narcissus finally knows is the self deprived of itself by a redundancy of 
presence: "My plentie makes me poore," he says in O ~ i d . ~  The self Oedipus finally 
"knowsn is precisely the "event," that to which the oracles "might ever be applied." His fate 
unfolded before him, the King sees not the record of coherent intentionality, nor even of 
ambition (Oedipus' most willful act--his flight from Corinth--was an effort to escape fate) but 
the sheer relational circumstances of identity: the man who killed his father and married his 
mother and fathered monsters of incest. 
The political centerpiece of Spenser's Book of Justice, so delicate as to require 
simultaneous unfolding and effacement, is the trial and execution of Mary Queen of Scots. 
Spenser makes the allegorized trial a launching ground for larger adventures, a preliminary 
site for training political sensibility before the liberation of the Lowlands, France, and Ireland 
can be carried out. (If the figures of "Belge," "Burbon," and "Irena" stand with exceptional 
directness for the Lowlands, France, and Ireland, the allegorical logic that subsumes them 
nearly buckles under the burden of intransigent public affairs. The Irena rescued from 
oppression, for example, is an Ireland "rescued" from every vestige of its native culture, an 
Ireland of the pritish] mind, the colonialist's blank page.)63 Arthur receives the quest of 
Belge in Mercilla's court. This is to insist that the story of Mary Stuart be read as part of the 
larger and concerted threat of international Catholicism. England's challenge to Catholicism 
rested upon the touchy issue of succession. When Henry VIII put aside his first wife and 
broke with papal authority, he willy nilly made way for an English Reformation as well as 
for a new heir to the throne: both encountered fierce challenges to their legitimacy. Though 
Elizabeth reigned for 45 years, her childlessness meant that the succession question never 
really settled down. 
In the last years of Elizabeth's reign, when Spenser wrote the Book of Justice, King 
James of Scotland had become the heir apparent, but not the heir anointed. James, like 
Britomart, boasted a double lineage (in his case, both Tudor and Stuart) that was at once his 
strength and his liability. James, like Elizabeth, had to negotiate the scandal of one parent 
conspiring in the death of the other, the scandal of a mother beheaded as a notorious strumpet 
and a traitor to the throne of England. For James as for Elizabeth, the unbroken lineage of 
divine right monarchy was based on selective memory and strategic amnesia. Mary Stuart 
was an impediment for them both. To deprive conspirators domestic and foreign of their 
perpetual figurehead, Elizabeth had at last to cut off the recognition scene (sister monarch, 
mother whore) that would be fatal to Justice. James himself had some vested interest in 
seeing his troublesome mother dead, so long as he was required neither to acknowledge her 
guilt nor to blame his adopted mother, Elizabeth, for her demise. In Spenser's Book of 
Justice, Arthur, who is always prepared to see some shadow of the Faerie Queene in any 
pretty face, is sorely troubled by pity for Mary allegorized, until the spectacle of her 
trespasses (murder, sedition, incontinence, adultery, impiety--many of these had been 
specifically disallowed as evidence in Mary's actual trial) makes him repent "his former 
fancies ruth" (V ix 49). As False Florimell vanishes before the True Florimell ("Like the 
true saint beside the image set," V iii 24), so Mary-as-Duessa simply melts away before 
Mercilla, the true image of the Tudor Queen. Or so she seems to be disposed of. Scrupu- 
lously relegated to the white space between cantos in the Book of Justice, as all of Spenser's 
readers knew, was another bloody severance of crown and body natural. 
* 
At the end of a trying decade, Essex lost his head as well. He had come back a 
popular hero from the expedition to Cadiz only to endure the Queen's reproach over the size 
of Spanish bounty. He had quarreled with Elizabeth over the disposition of Ireland, had 
turned his back on her in the Council, and had threatened to draw his sword in her presence; 
he had been slapped and banished from Court and forgiven. He took his turn at last in the 
debacle of the Irish campaign, encountered a predictable quagmire,64 and on 28 September, 
1599, returned unauthorized to London and made his way to the Queen's private bedcham- 
ber, where he found her uncorseted, unbewigged, unpainted, and generally unequipped to 
soften the spectacle made by sixty-six years of strenuous living. He saw the Queen three 
times that day and never again. 
In the fourteen months that followed, during successive periods of imprisonment, 
house arrest, and exile from Court, Essex addressed to Elizabeth a series of letters that sound 
for all the world like overheated versions of Erophilus: "for till I may appear in your 
gracious presence, and kiss your Majesty's fair,correcting hand, time itself is a perpetual 
night, and the whole world but a sepulchre unto your Majesty's humblest va s~a l . "~  Erotic 
compliment groans with. more than the usual burden of praise-and-petition. The Queen 
remarked to Francis Bacon that she had received from Essex "some very dutiful letters," but 
"when she took it to be the abundance of the heart, she found it to be but a preparative to a 
suit for the renewing of his farm of sweet wines."& The monopoly on sweet wines 
constituted Essex's chief source of income at this time, and he was heavily in debt. When 
the Queen allowed the monopoly to expire at Michaelmas, Essex threw caution to the winds. 
The handsome young man who had for so long found in Elizabeth a flattering endorsement of 
his own inflated self-image, was heard to remark that she had become "no lesse crooked in 
minde than in body."67 He approached the King of Scotland with importunate advice about 
staking claim to the English succession. He folded the king's reply in a little black bag 
which he theatrically wore about his neck and theatrically burned on the evening of his failed 
rebellion. His confederates later testified that Essex aspired to be king himself; he had long 
"affected popularity. "68 In rumor and the popular imagination, the Earl was at the center of 
two conflicting scenarios (the accession of James, the accession of Robert Devereux) for the 
rescue of England from the unnatural stranglehold of a declining female monarchy. In the 
event, when his hand was forced on the morning of 8 February, 1601, Essex marched not to 
Whitehall but to the city, where he had been told that his cause would be echoed and 
augmented by a popular uprising. But he did not meet with the reflection he sought in the 
multitude that loved him. 
Elizabeth's last decade was a time of widespread disaffection--her subjects were 
burdened with oppressive taxation, successive years of crop failure and plague visitation, with 
costly and indecisive wars, factionalism at court, depressed trade, and recurrent social 
instability. One irreverent historian has recently summarized the last Tudor reign as "thirty 
years of illusion, followed by fifteen of disill~sion"~~; the mirror of Elizabethan subjectivity 
was showing the fault lines of age. Elizabeth was less often to be seen in public in these later 
years. Ralegh called her "a lady whom time had ~urprised."~" There was public grumbling 
about the annual Accession Day celebrations, which had to be defended against charges of 
idolatry. At the same time and on the other hand, the privy council had to contend with 
public bell-ringings and prayers on behalf of the Earl of Essex and in 1600 had to prohibit 
the spontaneous engraving and distribution of his picture." Essex's capacity to capture 
popular affection was at this time unparalleled. Spenser seems to have participated in the 
general enthusiasm, catching Essex's image in mirrors more than one: in Calidore's 
disseminations of courtliness and in Arthegall's rescue of Burbon, in the "flower of Cheual- 
rie," "Great Englands gloryn praised in the Prothalamion, and in the great man proposed for 
governor of Ireland in the View--"suche an one I Coulde name," the poet writes, "vppon 
whom the ey of all Englande is fixed and our laste hopes now rest. "R 
Sentenced to a savage and spectacular death--Essex was condemned to be hanged, cut 
down alive, disembowelled, and quartered--England's last hope remained defiant: "I think it 
fitting that my poor quarters, which have done her Majesty true service in divers parts of the 
world, should now at the last be sacrificed and disposed of at her Majesty's plea~ure."~ But 
when his private chaplain constrained the Earl to contemplate eternal death, Essex broke 
down completely. He owned and renounced, owned in order to renounce, his treasonous 
ambition and his treasonous friends. He named names in abundance, especially warning the 
Queen against his own sister, Lady Rich. The grisly spectacle of public quartering was 
translated to private beheading.74 On the scaffold as in the tiltyard, Essex propounded a self 
that referred itself to an Other. In the constructed reflexivity of the penitential gaze, Essex 
revived the referential likeness he had invoked five years earlier in his performance of Love 
and Self-Love." 
The 'stakes were no longer a solicitor generalship or a farm of sweet wines, and 
Majesty was no longer a woman. Facing death, Essex prayed aloud for his enemies; a 
Christian who refused forgiveness to others could scarcely expect to claim forgiveness for 
himself. Orthodoxy taught that even the foremost popular hero of his age shared a single 
stamp of divinity, and a common stamp of sin, with his fellow creatures. Elizabethan court 
politics, however, had taught the Earl and his enemies to embellish ontological equivalence 
by means of an elaborate, emulative competition in private grandeur and public "service."76 
The Earl had for years been first among equals and imitators, the pattern for courtly address, 
the most conspicuous and insubordinate subject of late Tudor England. In his last public 
appearance, love and self-interest conjoined in a gesture of forgiveness that was perfectly 
conventional, as was the doctrine of likeness it invoked and was predicated upon. But in a 
remarkable piece of syntactical ambiguity, a skeptic may still discern the echo of extravagant 
self-regard: Forgive them, Essex prayed on the scaffold, because "they bear the image of 
God as well as myself."" "As well as I do," we would like him to say. But the fact was 
that his enemies and competitors bore something of Essex's image as well. They had no 
choice: he was the mirror of manhood for his age. "A subject of God, a subject subjected to 
God, a subiect through the Subiect and subiected to the Subiect."" Essex was always 
tempted to construe himself a subject in the upper case. This does not mean that his scaffold 
speech was a piece of simple hypocrisy. Essex lived on a fault line, where two 
incommensurate constructions of subject status collided. What Althusser writes in the spirit 
of demystification (Althusser is bound to a different faith) about "the Christian religious 
ideology," Essex and his contemporaries were still prepared to write in blood: "those who 
have recognized God, and have recognized themselves in Him, will be s a ~ e d . " ~  
NOTES 
1. Think, for example, of the exemplary stories of private suffering we routinely invoke to 
hallow or indict nationalist and ethnic aspiration. In the realm of high- and leisure-cultural 
production, even as the European novel dismantled such homage to the Aristotelian unities as 
it had ever erected (a linear beginning, middle, end), even as historians were refusing to tell 
us with any straightforwardness what it was that happened in the past, even as literary critics 
were fleeing from such concepts as authorial intention and unity of voice, the American 
appetite for biography--both popular academic--soared. 
2. These hearings were a national obsession two months ago but will no doubt quickly dim. 
Against that dimming, then, a thumbnail (and a partisan) chronology of the salient events: 
Clarence Thomas, a forty-three-year-old conservative black jurist, who had worked in the 
Department of Education, had headed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and 
had served, for a single year, on the Federal Court of Appeals, was in July of 1991 nominat- 
ed by President Bush to a seat on the Supreme Court of the United States. This opening on 
the court had been occasioned by the retirement of Thurgood Marshall, an eminent black 
jurist with a long history of activism in the cause of civil rights, including many years of 
service as special counsel to the NAACP, as a United States Circuit judge, as Solicitor 
General under President Johnson, and, for twenty-four years, as an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court. Throughout. the nomination period, Thomas's supporters emphasized his 
biography as the chief of his qualifications: the judge, a son of sharecroppers, had fought 
poverty and racism to graduate from Yale Law School and assume public office. The 
confirmation hearings conducted by the Senate Judiciary Committee (September 10-20, 1991) 
were much animated by the issues of affirmative action and abortion, widely perceived to be 
the pivotal issues facing the court in the 1990's and the issues that had governed the Presi- 
dent's nomination (Thomas was unambiguously on the record as an opponent of affirmative 
action and was suspected of opposing abortion rights as well). During four days of question- 
ing, Thomas professed to have no opinion on Roe vs. Wade, the Supreme Court decision 
which had extended to abortion the right to privacy established by an earlier decision, 
Griswold v. Connecticut. Questioned about his praise for an article in which Lewis Lehrman 
argues that fetuses have an inalienable right to life under the Declaration of Independence, 
Thomas replied that he had not really read the article and had praised it in order to please an 
audience of conservative Republicans at the Heritage Foundation (see Polonius, below). On 
October 27, 1991, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted 7 to 7 on the Thomas nomination 
and sent it to the full Senate without a recommendation. 
Two days before the scheduled vote on the Senate floor, word was leaked to a 
political correspondent for National Public Radio that the Judiciary Committee had withheld 
from public purview a damaging accusation of sexual harassment. A former assistant to 
Judge Thomas at the Department of Education and the EEOC, a thirty-five-year-old black 
woman who was currently a law professor at the University of Oklahoma, had testified to 
congressional aides and subsequently to the FBI that Clarence Thomas had repeatedly 
subjected her to sexual harassment on the job. Public furor eventuated in a second round of 
hearings, these televised, conducted under the constraint of a seven-day delay in the Senate 
vote, and deliberately divorced from official Senate procedures: though conducted by the 
Senate Judiciary committee, the hearings were neither an official part of that committee's 
deliberations (there would be no second committee vote) nor a part of the full Senate floor 
debate. In the course of 72 hours, Clarence Thomas testified twice, Anita Hill once. Hill's 
story was corroborated by three persons in whom she had confided during and soon after the 
alleged sexual hardssments and by the results of a lie detector test, which was reported in the 
press but not in the public hearings. Thomas was supported by witnesses (and interrogators) 
who praised his character and constructed alternative--and contradictory--narratives to impugn 
Hill's motives (she had romantic designs on Thomas and was seeking the revenge of a 
woman scorned; she was excessively ambitious and eager for the notoriety that would accrue 
to her as the result of Senate testimony; she was the pawn of left-wing conspirators; she was 
delusional). John Doggett, a former co-worker, came forward to claim that he, too, had been 
the object of Hill's erotic obsessions. In the end, Clarence Thomas was confirmed on the full 
Senate floor by a vote of 52 to 48. Opinion polls conducted immediately after the televised 
hearings revealed that fully two-thirds of the American public, including two-thirds of 
American women, believed Clarence Thomas to be telling the truth and believed Anita Hill to 
be lying. 
3. Raymond Williams, Kevwords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1976), 259-64; Peter S tallybrass, "Shakespeare, the Individual, and 
the Text," forthcoming in Cultural Studies, ed. Larry Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula 
. Treichla (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). In his entry on subjectivity and the 
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positions in the history of Western philosophy and social thought. Stallybrass traces the 
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indivisibility, or the "indistinguishable relation between parts" (3), and that of autonomy, "the 
separation of the part from the whole" (3). Prior to the seventeenth-century, Stallybrass 
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dogma: "hye and indyvyduall Trynyte" (2). It is in the writing of an English Leveller, 
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leaves its first literary trace (27). In Chaucer and the Subiect of History (Madison: Univ. of 
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Problematic Politics of Identity,' Laura Downs, May 92 (CRSO #469). 
'The Return of the State,' Timothy Mitchell, May 92 (CRSO #470). 
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(CRSO #476). 
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'Perpetrators, Accomplices, Victims: Further Reflections of Domination as Social Practice,' Alf Ludtke, May 92 (CRSO W 1 ) .  
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